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The Private Capital Tax Rates for Large 
Heterogeneous Jurisdictions in a Two-Period Economy 
with Spillover Effects 1
Tong Yang
Abstract
　This study introduces the spillover effect of public goods and the heterogeneity of jurisdictions to the capital 
tax competition literature using a two-period economy. A clear result is that the private capital tax rate used by 
the hyperopic jurisdictional government in the first period significantly depends on the relative size of the 
income and spill-in effects in the second period. The relative size of the two effects, which work in opposite 
directions, is determined by the tastes and endowments of the jurisdictions, the form of their production 
functions and the degree of spillovers, among other factors. This research verifies that the jurisdiction with the 
less efficient production technology may choose to tax private capital in the first period, assuming that a lump-
sum tax is available to it, and receive substantial spillover benefits from the other jurisdiction with more 
efficient production technology in the second period when the jurisdiction is hyperopic and benevolent, which 
is quite different from the literature.
Keywords: Tax competition; Benefit spillovers; Heterogeneous Jurisdictions
JEL classification: H2, H4, J6
1.  Introduction
　This study reconsiders the capital tax rate used by a jurisdictional government in a two-period economy 
with spillover effects when the jurisdictional government is assumed to be hyperopic or farsighted. In the 
literature, Ogawa (2000) confirms that the jurisdictional government may subsidise private capital in the 
first period to increase capital stock in the second period when a lump-sum tax is available to a hyperopic 
jurisdictional government. However, the spillover effects and the heterogeneity of jurisdictions are ignored 
in the analysis. Therefore, this study introduces the spillover effect of public goods and the heterogeneity of 
jurisdictions to the capital tax competition literature using a two-period economy.
　The literature analysing capital tax competition is relevant to this study (see, for example, Zodrow and 
Mieszkowski 1986; DePater and Myers 1994). The basic idea of Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) is that 
perfect mobility of private capital among small homogeneous jurisdictions results in under-provision 
of a local public good, which is financed by a distortionary property tax because a lump-sum tax is 
unavailable. However, DePater and Myers (1994) demonstrate that the pecuniary externality among large 
heterogeneous jurisdictions derived from a change in the capital price, which is affected by distortionary 
1   I would like to thank professor Hikaru Ogawa at Japan Institute of Public Finance 2020 at Tohoku University, where 
this paper was presented under the title “A Corrective Device for Large Heterogeneous Jurisdictions in a Two-Period 
Economy with Spillover Effects”.
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capital taxes, should be moderately internalised by a corrective device. In the traditional small-jurisdiction 
tax competition model, the after-tax return to capital is a parameter for each jurisdiction. In this paper, there 
are only two jurisdictions, so the after-tax return to capital is endogenous, which, unsurprisingly, leads to 
tax exporting. There are large-jurisdiction models in the literature, including Hauer and Wooton (1999), 
Kanbur and Keen (1993) and many others. This study is based on a large-jurisdiction model that is similar 
to those in the literature above.
　On the other hand, the costs of moving faced by private capital, which are also referred to as transaction 
costs (see, for example, Lee 1997), should not be ignored in a tax competition model. When the private 
capital investor has decided to locate in one jurisdiction and invest in some projects, these projects will 
usually last for a long period of time. Once the private capital is invested, it is usually quite difficult to 
abandon the projects and leave the jurisdiction because of the large moving costs. Even if the private capital 
can move freely among the jurisdictions in the initial stage, imperfect mobility is inevitable in the later 
stages. Therefore, we must consider both transaction costs and inter-temporal effects in a tax competition 
model. There are several relevant studies that consider such issues. For example, Lee (1997) considers 
the imperfect mobility of private capital arising from transaction costs in a two-period tax competition 
model. He shows that a jurisdictional government will over-provide local public goods in the second 
period because of transaction costs and that the jurisdictions may choose a lower capital tax rate than that 
chosen in a one-period tax competition model to increase capital stock in the first period. Furthermore, 
by introducing a head tax into the model, Ogawa (2000) confirms that the jurisdictional government may 
subsidise private capital in the first period to increase capital stock in the second period when the private 
capital cannot mobile in the second period. This result is compatible with that of the repeated game 
explained by Coates (1993). There are also some two-period-model constructions that are relevant to our 
study (for example, King, McAfee and Welling 1993). However, most of the relevant literature analysing 
the transaction costs and dynamic effects does not clarify the important roles played by the spillover effects 
of public goods and the heterogeneity of jurisdictions in a repeated-game model. Hence, the focus of this 
study is to examine these roles.
　In the discussion on the spillover effects of local public goods among different jurisdictions, the 
prevailing view is that such spillover effects will aggravate the under-provision of local public goods (see, 
for example, Boadway, Pestieau and Wildasin 1989). However, another quite different view is that the 
spillover effects of local public goods may alleviate the under-provision of local public goods in some 
situations. In a repeated-game model with large homogeneous jurisdictions, Kawachi and Ogawa (2006) 
find that the jurisdictional governments are more inclined to provide an efficient level of local public goods 
when the degree of the spillover effects is sufficient. Furthermore, Ogawa (2007) confirms that, in a tax 
competition model with large heterogeneous jurisdictions, the jurisdiction with less efficient production 
technology is likely to increase its capital tax rate to drive out private capital and obtain substantial spill-in 
effects from the other jurisdiction with more efficient production technology. This means that a distortional 
capital tax may lead to a more efficient level of local public goods funding. This finding is a key motivation 
and implication for the current study. Recognizing these effects and the heterogeneity of jurisdictions, Yang 
(2020) noted that “the revision of a corrective device used by the central government in the first period to 
ensure an optimal level of a local public good which is provided by a hyperopic jurisdictional government, 
－ 103 －
significantly depends on the relative size of the income and spill-in effects in the second period” . 
However, the jurisdictional governments consider the corrective device only in the first period when 
making the capital tax rate decision because they do not believe in the central government’s commitment 
to the corrective device in the second period. In addition, it is also difficult to know how to determine the 
corrective device according to the discount factor and whether the local public goods are over-provided or 
under-provided. Therefore, it is not realistic to analyse the corrective device based on a simple two-period 
economy. Instead, the capital tax rate may be suitable to be analysed as a baseline in the literature.
　By introducing spillover effects into our analysis, this study verify that the jurisdiction with the less 
efficient production technology may choose to tax private capital in the first period, assuming that a lump-
sum tax is available to it, and receive substantial spillover benefits from the other jurisdiction with more 
efficient production technology in the second period when the jurisdiction is hyperopic and benevolent, 
which is quite different from Ogawa (2000). In other words, these constructions are put together to model 
an interesting phenomenon and not simply to arrive at predetermined results.
　The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The basic model is set out in section 2, in which 
we introduce the spillover effects of public goods and the heterogeneity of jurisdictions into a two-period 
economy. In section 3, we show the Nash equilibria by employing backward induction to obtain the capital 
tax rate used by the jurisdictional government in the two periods. In section 4, we discuss our findings 
based on the derived capital tax rate. Section 5 draws conclusions.
2.  The Model
　The model that we use is similar to that used in Ogawa (2000). There are two heterogeneous jurisdictions 
in a two-period game2 and, in each jurisdiction i (i＝1, 2)3 , the immobile resident is normalised to 
unity, with preferences defined by a strictly quasi-concave utility function4 Upi  (xpi , Gpi ), where xpi  is the 
consumption of a private numeraire good in period p (p＝1, 2) and Gpi  is the consumption of a local public 
good in period p. The local public good Gpi  is defined by:
　  （1）
where gpi  is the provision of the local public good by jurisdictional government i and ji (0≦ ji≦1) is a 
parameter indicating the degree of spillover benefits from jurisdiction j to jurisdiction i.






 can be rewritten as fkip (kpi ) and fkikp (kpi ), respectively, where kpi  is the private capital 
2   The model can be written in a simpler way using only one period (see, for example, Ogawa 2007). However, as this 
paper focuses on how the degree of governmental hyperopia and asymmetry in capital ownership affect the optimal 
redistribution mechanism, the dynamic effects must be considered.
3   For simplicity, we assume that there are only two jurisdictions in the model. It can be confirmed that most of the 
results in this paper will not change qualitatively even if there are more than two jurisdictions.
4  The properties of the utility functions are similar to those in the extant literature (for example, Ogawa 2000).
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employed by jurisdiction i in period p. The production function can be assumed to take the quadratic form, 
for example, f i(kpi )＝ai ki－0.5bi ki2, which is also used by Wildasin (1991) and Ogawa (2007) in their 
numerical analyses, because the marginal productivity of private capital can take a linear and concise form, 
that is, fkip (kpi)＝ai－bi ki. The production technology in the jurisdiction depends on the parameters ai and 
bi. The private capital is perfectly mobile in the first period and perfectly immobile in the second period. 
We assume that the private capital is myopic, following Ogawa (2000). The reason behind this is that the 
jurisdictional governments cannot commit to second-period taxes given the immobility of private capital 
in the second period. Even if the private tax rate was 100% in the second period, the private capital could 
not move to another jurisdiction. Thus, the private capital providers consider the tax rate only in the first 
period when making the location decision because they do not believe in the jurisdictional government’s 
commitment to the tax rate in the second period. In other words, the capital owners do not take into account 
second-period taxation in their location decision.




　In equilibrium, therefore, the after-tax return to capital in the first period is equalised across jurisdictions 
as follows:
　  （3）
where t 1i is the tax rate per unit of capital employed by jurisdiction i and r is the after-tax return to private 
capital in the country in the first period. Based on the established conventions, for example, see Bucovetsky 
(1991) and Ogawa (2007), we obtain the effect of changes in the first-period tax rate on the after-tax return 








　The budget constraint of the resident in the first period requires that:
　  （7）
where k
_1i  is the initial endowment of private capital in jurisdiction i with k_1i＝ ik_. Following Ogawa 
(2000), we postulate that i is a fraction of the capital stock owned by the resident in jurisdiction i and that 
it does not change with time, where i＋ j＝1.
　Substituting (3) into (7), (7) can be rewritten as:
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　  （7’）
　During the second period, the after-tax return to capital may differ between the two jurisdictions because 
of the immobility of private capital. Therefore, the budget constraint of the resident in the second period 
requires that:
　  （8）
　Owing to the immobility of private capital in the second period, the amount of private capital located 
in jurisdiction i in the second period is equal to the amount in the first period, that is, k1i＝k2i . The 
jurisdictional government budget constraint is given by:
　  （9）
3.  The Nash Equilibria
　As this two-period game is a subgame perfect equilibrium, we employ backward induction to solve the 
problem for each jurisdictional government.
3.1  The second period
　In the second period, the jurisdictional government i maximises the utility of the residents by choosing 
t2i  and g2i , given t2j and g2j. Although the jurisdictional governments cannot commit to second-period taxes, 
some facts (for example, the laws and policies in the jurisdictions) stop the capital-importing country from 
taxing away all capital and redistributing it to its citizens. Therefore, the capital owners would foresee this 
in their location decision. Following Ogawa (2000), the optimisation problem for jurisdictional government 
i can be written as:
　
　The first-order condition for jurisdictional government i is given by:
　  （10）
where the jurisdictional government i takes k2i  as k1i  in the first period. It can be derived that the second-
order condition is satisfied under some realistic functional assumptions and the properties of the equilibria 
－ 106 －
are fully determined (see Ogawa 2007). Rearranging (10), we have:
　  （11）
　The Pareto-optimal condition is derived by5:
　
　Let  denotes the Lagrange multiplier of the constraint above. Then, the Lagrange function is given by:
　
　Differentiating L(x2i , g2i ) with respect to x2i , g2i   ,and , yields:
　
　which can be rewritten as:
　  （12）
　Rearranging (12), we have:
　  （13）
　This finding corresponds with the conclusions from the existing literature (for example, see Bjorvatn and 
Schjelderup 2002). Notably, this result is an extension of Ogawa (2000) with reference to a particular case.
　Considering (13), the inefficiency here arises first from the under-provision of local public goods 
resulting from the spillover effects. This is determined by the degree of spillovers. The larger are the 
degree of spillovers, the larger is the positive externality. In addition, considering (11), inefficiency arises 
from the over-provision of local public goods resulting from tax exporting6. This effect is determined by 
5   For the sake of simplicity, the central government is not introduced into the model, which is different from Yang 
(2020). Of course, the inefficiency on local provision of public goods is inevitable from the viewpoint of central 
government.
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the proportion of the capital stock owned by the jurisdiction’s residents. The larger this proportion is, the 
larger is the negative fiscal externality ignored by the jurisdictional government. If the former positive 
externality is larger than the latter negative fiscal externality, the net effect is that local public goods are 
under-provided by the jurisdictional government in the second period. Conversely, if the former positive 
externality is smaller than the latter negative fiscal externality, the net effect is that local public goods are 
over-provided by the jurisdictional government in the second period. This finding may be summarised in 
the following proposition.
Proposition 1: If the spillover effect is larger than the tax-exporting effect in the second period, the local 
public good is under-provided. On the contrary, if the spillover effect is smaller than the tax-exporting 
effect in the second period, the local public good is over-provided.
　This proposition mainly restates what the prior literature has found in similar contexts (see, for example, 
Bjorvatn and Schjelderup 2002).
3.2  The first period
　The capital tax rate in the second period depends on the amount of private capital located in jurisdiction i 
in the second period. Owing to the immobility of private capital in the second period, the amount of private 
capital located in jurisdiction i in the second period is equal to the amount in the first period, that is, k1i＝
k2i . At the same time, the amount of private capital located in jurisdiction i in the first period depends on the 
capital tax rate, which is chosen by the jurisdictional government in the first period. Therefore, following 
Ogawa (2000), we assume that t2i＝q(t1i ), where t2i  is expressed as a function of t1i . This means that how 
the jurisdictional government i chooses the optimal capital tax rate in the second period is significantly 
determined by the capital tax rate that it chose in the first period. Note that this does not mean that t2i  is 
predetermined. The jurisdictional government chooses t1i  to maximise the discounted sum of the utilities 
in the two periods, given the variables for jurisdictional government j. If the jurisdictional government is 
hyperopic, the maximisation problem for jurisdictional government i in the first period can be written as:
　
6   See Noiset (2003).
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by assuming that the discount factor for the jurisdictional government is i  0. To derive the first-order 
condition, we use the substitution method and differentiate u1i  with respect to t1i . Substituting (1), (3), (7), (8), 
(9) into the objective function, we obtain:
　 （14）
　Substituting (11) into (14), (14) can be rewritten as:
　 （15）
　Rearranging (15) with cancellation, we have:
　 （16）
　Using (2) and the assumption that k1i＝k2i , the first-order condition can be written as:
　 （17）
　It can be derived that the second-order condition is satisfied under some realistic functional assumptions 
and the properties of the equilibria are fully determined (see Ogawa 2007).
　Notably, this result is an extension of Ogawa (2000) with reference to a particular case.
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4.  Discussion
　We assume that we are on the left-hand side of a Laffer curve, k1i＋ t1i 1i1i ＞0. As 1i1i ＜0, we know from 
(17) that how the jurisdictional government changes the private capital tax rate depends only on the curly 
bracketed term if i increases7. On the one hand, the hyperopic jurisdictional government has an incentive 
to decrease the tax rate in the first period to attract the private capital because the jurisdictional government 
considers the income in the second period (the income effect). The first term in the curly bracketed term of 
(17) is positive. However, if the spillover effect in the second period is taken into account by the hyperopic 
jurisdictional government, the jurisdictional government has an incentive to increase the tax rate in the 
first period to drive out the private capital and obtain the spillover benefits from the other jurisdiction (the 
spill-in effect). The second term in the curly bracketed term of (17) is negative. The relationship between 
the private capital tax rate in the first period and the degree of hyperopia of the jurisdictional government 
significantly depends on the relative size of the two effects that are working in the opposite direction in the 
second period, as stated succinctly in the following proposition.
Proposition 2: When the income effect is larger than the spill-in effect in the second period, the private 
capital tax rate in the first period used by a more hyperopic jurisdictional government is decreased. 
Conversely, when the spill-in effect is larger than the income effect in the second period, the private capital 
tax rate in the first period used by a more hyperopic jurisdictional government is increased.
　Notice that the external validity of this proposition depends on a political strategy of the politicians. The 
benefits that the politicians can obtain in one jurisdiction (the re-election rent) equals the marginal increase 
in the probability of re-election multiplied by the value of being re-elected. Of course, these factors are 
seen as the exogenous variables in this model. If the politicians would like to stand for election for the 
next term, the conclusion would be valid and could also be a benchmark for some extensions in the future. 
However, if the politicians would like to stand down, they would be myopic and their discount factor might 
be zero in the first period. The result would collapse into the finding in Ogawa (2007).
　Now, we state the boundaries of the research and applications of the model. In some suburban areas, 
for example, less populated areas surrounding a metropolitan area but of lower socioeconomic status, 
beneficial spillovers of local public goods from the urban core are necessary and essential for the suburban 
residents. If the politicians in these kinds of jurisdictions place a significant weight on the distant future, 
the under-provision of local public goods might be eased to some extent. However, in some urban areas, 
for example, a densely populated urban core in a metropolitan area with high socioeconomic status, benefit 
spillovers of local public goods from the surrounding territories are unnecessary and negligible for these 
urban residents. If the politicians in these kinds of jurisdictions place a significant weight on the distant 
future, the under-provision of local public goods might be aggravated to some extent.
7   Of course, it does not mean that the corrective device from the central government can be determined easily 
according to the change of capital tax rate as the literature (see, for example, Yang 2020). There are many other 
endogenous determinants of the corrective device for Large Heterogeneous Jurisdictions (for example, the stock of 
capital in the jurisdictions). Thus, only the capital tax rate can be determined according to the discount factor.
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　This result is quite different from Ogawa (2000). One jurisdictional government might tax private capital 
in the first period to receive more benefit spillovers from other jurisdictions in the second period even if 
a lump-sum tax is available for the benevolent and hyperopic jurisdictional government. Of course, the 
robustness and external validity of this research requires further analysis and the incorporation of other key 
assumptions such as, for example, political re-election motivations.
5.  Conclusions
　This paper has focused on the private capital tax rate in a two-period model in which spillover effects are 
considered. We have obtained the following results.
　(1) If the spillover effect is larger than the tax-exporting effect in the second period, the local public good 
is under-provided. Conversely, if the spillover effect is smaller than the tax-exporting effect in the second 
period, the local public good is over-provided.
　(2) When the income effect is larger than the spill-in effect in the second period, for example, if the 
production technology in the jurisdiction is significantly higher than in other jurisdictions and the spillover 
benefits received by the jurisdiction are not very large, the private capital tax rate used by a more hyperopic 
jurisdictional government is decreased in the first period. Conversely, when the spill-in effect is larger 
than the income effect in the second period, for example, the production technology in the jurisdiction is 
significantly lower than in other jurisdictions and the spillover benefits received by the jurisdiction are 
relatively large, the private capital tax rate used by a more hyperopic jurisdictional government is increased 
in the first period.
　For simplicity, it has been assumed that capital is perfectly immobile in the second period. If we 
introduce transactions costs into the model in the second period, our results may be adjusted quantitatively. 
However, our findings about the private capital tax rate will not be changed qualitatively even if capital is 
imperfectly mobile in the second period.
　There is no inter-temporal redistribution via public debt or public investment as would usually be 
relevant when determining public finances across time (for example, Barro 1979; Jensen and Toma 1991). 
In a dynamic model, the timing of and commitment to policies (for example, see Wildasin 2003) matter. 
However, for simplicity’s sake, these issues are not addressed in the present research. This topic is left for 
future research.
　It is worth noting that the degree of hyperopia of jurisdictional government is determined by the 
probability of re-election and the rent from being re-elected for the politicians. If the politicians in the 
jurisdiction can obtain high rent from being re-elected or if the probability that the politicians will be re-
elected in the next term is very high, the jurisdictional government may possess greater foresight in this 
term, and vice versa. Although these factors are seen as the exogenous variables in this study, the finding 
could provide a benchmark for some extensions in the future. Therefore, in future work, it would be 
interesting to take into account these issues concerning the incumbents and the anti-incumbency factors.
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